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From psychology of terrorists to psychology of terrorism

De la psychologie des terroristes à la psychologie du terrorisme

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Abstract

Terrorism as an act of violence involves a vast and multi-factorial network of sociopolitical causes. Yet this choice of action corresponds to another form of social violence. As psychologists, we can try to explain the consequences of terrorism, the reasons why terrorist groups always seem able to recruit new people for their purpose. It is also, perhaps, the link between these two issues which is even more interesting to explain. This paper offers a short review of past and contemporary hypotheses and research on terrorism in the field of psychology. More generally, this review considers international terrorism mainly perpetrated by radical Islamist fundamentalists. We will focus here on recent studies proposing that identity and, more specifically, social identity could be

Résumé

Considérer le terrorisme en tant qu'acte de violence nous amène à nous confronter à un vaste réseau de causes multifactorielles et socio-politiques. Ce choix d'action n'est ni plus ni moins qu'une forme particulière de violence sociale. En tant que psychologues, nous pouvons tenter d'expliquer les conséquences du terrorisme et les raisons pour lesquelles les groupes terroristes semblent toujours en mesure de recruter de nouvelles personnes pour leur cause. C'est aussi d'expliquer les liens entre ces deux questions qui peut s'avérer le plus intéressant. Cet article propose un bref aperçu des hypothèses historiques et contemporaines des recherches sur le terrorisme dans le domaine de la psychologie. Plus généralement, cette revue envisage le terrorisme international principa-

Key-words

Terrorism, terrorist,
threat, social identity

Mots-clés

Terrorisme, terroriste,
menace, identité
sociale

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important factors in terrorism. Within these studies or reports, some point out the importance in contemporary terrorism of the threat that Western countries impute to Muslim and Arab identity. As a conclusion, and in line with other authors, we introduce an integrative analysis framework for a vicious terror circle which begins with fear and threat, leads to the derogation of Muslim population in Western countries, and produces a fertile ground for the recruitment of terrorist sympathizers.

lement causé par des intégristes islamistes radicaux. Nous allons nous concentrer sur des études récentes qui tendent à proposer que l'identité, et notamment l'identité sociale, pourraient être des facteurs importants du terrorisme. Certaines de ces études, ou rapports sur le terrorisme contemporain, font remarquer l'importance de la menace que les pays occidentaux prêtent à l'identité musulmane. Pour conclure et en accord avec d'autres chercheurs nous proposons un cadre d'analyse intégrateur sur un cercle vicieux de la terreur qui débute par de la peur et de la menace conduisant à la discrimination de la population Musulmane dans les pays occidentaux, produisant ainsi un terreau fertile pour le recrutement de sympathisants de la cause terroriste.

Nowadays, terrorism is mostly related by lay perceivers to international terrorism and, more generally, to violent action linked to Jihadism. Indeed, 9/11 has not only changed the world but also deeply increased the salience and threat of terrorism in Western countries. This kind of terrorism is relatively new, though really beginning in the 1980s, and is not representative of terrorist acts around the world. Domestic terrorism rooted on singular, idiosyncratic local situations is still the more deadly one. This issue, as we will see, focuses on international terrorism and provides further specification on terrorism linked to Jihadism. All conclusions must subsequently be read bearing in mind that this paper only considers these specific forms of terrorism without alluding to other forms of terrorism, such as specific terrorist acts of isolated individual (for example, Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber, a lonely terrorist acting against the “industrial system”), or independence or separatist movements that have sometimes used terrorism (for example, Irish Republican Army – IRA – or Euskadi

We vs. Them: Terrorism in an Intergroup Perspective

Nous vs. Eux : Perspective Intergroupe du Terrorisme

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Abstract

Since the attacks on the United States of America on September 11, 2001, a new interest in terrorism has been growing in psychology. Nevertheless, as underlined by many authors, no single agreement exists as to the actual definition of *terrorism*. In our opinion, from a psychosocial perspective, an ambiguous notion of terrorism may legitimate the ingroup/outgroup differentiation that affects intergroup relations. In this article, three studies were presented with the aim to understand what people refer to when they talk about terrorism. In particular, the influence of ethnocentrism and importance of media information on the definition of terrorism will be analyzed. Results confirm the influence of both ethnocentrism and media. In that sense, the definition of terrorism may hide an implicit ideology on the notions of war and terrorism that enhances the ingroup/outgroup opposition.

Résumé

Depuis les attentats aux Etats Unis d'Amérique le 11 Septembre 2001, un nouvel intérêt pour le terrorisme n'a cessé de croître en psychologie. Néanmoins, comme l'ont souligné de nombreux auteurs, il n'existe pas d'accord unanime quant à la définition même du terrorisme. Selon nous, d'un point de vue psychosocial, une conception ambiguë du terrorisme peut légitimer une différenciation intragroupe / hors-groupe qui affecte les relations intergroupes. Dans cet article, trois études ont été présentées dans le dessein de comprendre à quoi les gens se réfèrent quand ils parlent de terrorisme. L'influence de l'ethnocentrisme et l'importance des médias d'information dans la définition du terrorisme seront plus particulièrement analysées. Les résultats confirment tant l'influence de l'ethnocentrisme que celle des médias. En ce sens, la définition du terrorisme peut cacher une idéologie implicite des notions de guerre et de terrorisme qui renforce les oppositions entre intra groupe et hors groupe.

Key-words

Terrorism, war, ethnocentrism, media information, political attitudes, social representations

Mots-clés

Terrorisme, guerre, ethnocentrisme, média d'information, attitudes politiques, représentations sociales

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Why Are They Attacking Us? Decoding the Messages of al-Qaeda Terrorists Targeting the United States and Europe

Pourquoi nous attaquent-ils ? Décodage des messages des terroristes d'Al-Qaïda ciblant les Etats-Unis et l'Europe

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Abstract

The subject of terrorism has received significant attention in all forms of media, the political arena, and scientific publications in recent history. However, few have publicly dissected the messages that the terrorists have distributed. Theories and assertions have been advanced without taking into consideration the terrorists' own words. This study used the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC) to evaluate these messages. Forty messages that reference either the United States or Europe were assessed using this computer program and analyzed for statistical significance. Differences such as references to money, social processes, and time were observed. A review of terrorist literature and discussion of the results and their consequences is included.

Résumé

La question du terrorisme a attiré récemment l'attention de toutes sortes de médias, de l'arène politique et de publications scientifiques. Toutefois, peu de ces productions ont analysé les messages envoyés par les terroristes. Des théories et des affirmations ont été avancées sans que les propres mots des terroristes soient pris en compte. Cette étude a utilisé l'enquête linguistique par comptage de mots (Linguistic Inquiry Word Count, LIWC), un programme d'ordinateur, pour évaluer ces messages.. Quarante messages faisant référence aux États-Unis ou à l'Europe ont été évalués à l'aide de ce programme informatique et leur signification statistique a été étudiée. Des différences en termes de référence à l'argent, de processus sociaux et de temporalité ont été observées. Nous présentons une revue de la littérature sur les terroristes et discutons des résultats observés et de leurs conséquences.

Key-words

Terrorism, Linguistics,
Al-Qaeda, America,
Europe

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Explorations in the Experimental Social Psychology of Terrorism: The Struggle-Violence Link and its predictors

Exploration en psychologie sociale expérimentale du terrorisme : le couple lutte-violence et ses prédicteurs

Mark Dechesne*

Abstract

The aim of the present study was to identify factors that influence the strength of the association between struggle and violence. To that end, an instrument was developed that assessed the association between struggle and violence on the basis of response latencies. Students completed this task, and were also asked to answer questions about their experience during youth, high school and college. They also completed self-concept stability and narcissism scales. Participants who reported negative social youth experiences exhibited greater strength of association between struggle and violence. Also, greater self-concept instability was found to be marginally associated with stronger association between struggle and violence. Although obtained in laboratory situation that is by all accounts far removed from the real situation in which terrorism is enacted, the findings nonetheless appear to converge with some insights into the psychological dynamics at play in the world of terrorism.

Résumé

Le but de la présente étude était d'identifier les facteurs qui influencent la force de l'association entre lutte et violence. Afin d'évaluer le couple lutte-violence, un outil de mesure a été développé en s'appuyant sur les latences des réponses. Des étudiants ont effectué cette tâche et ont également complété un questionnaire sur leurs expériences de jeunesse, de collégiens et de lycéens. Ils ont également complété l'échelle de stabilité du concept de soi et l'échelle de narcissisme. Les participants qui ont vécu durant leur jeunesse des expériences négatives ont manifesté une plus grande force d'association entre la lutte et la violence. De plus, nous avons observé que la plus importante instabilité du concept de soi était associée de façon marginale au couple lutte-violence. Même si ces résultats sont obtenus dans un contexte de laboratoire éloigné d'une situation réelle où le terrorisme serait une réponse donnée, ils semblent pourtant rejoindre quelques-uns des aspects de la dynamique psychologique en jeu dans le monde du terrorisme.

Key-words

Terrorism,
Experimental,
Violence, Response
Latencies, Predictors

Mots-clés

Terrorisme,
expérimental, violence,
latence, prédicteurs

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Religious and National Identity as Predictors of Attitudes towards the 7/7 Bombings among British Muslims: An Analysis of UK Opinion Poll Data

Identités nationales et religieuses en tant que prédicteurs des attitudes des Musulmans britanniques : Analyse des données d'un sondage d'opinions au Royaume-Uni

Nicole Tausch*

Russell Spears*

Oliver Christ**

Abstract

Using data from a 2006 opinion survey of British Muslims ($N = 1000$), this study examined the role of importance of Muslim and British identity as proximal predictors of whether respondents viewed the 2005 London bombings as justified. We further explored the extent to which religious and national identity and support for terrorism were predicted by context (the concentration of Muslims in the area) and contact experiences with non-Muslims. The role of these variables was assessed over and above relevant demographic variables (gender, age, and SES). Structural equation modelling revealed that while there was no significant relationship between Muslim identity and support for the attacks, British

Résumé

Utilisant les données d'un sondage d'opinion réalisé en 2006 auprès de Musulmans Britanniques ($N = 1000$), cette étude porte sur l'importance respective des identités Musulmane et Britannique en tant que prédicteurs proximaux du fait que les participants à l'étude percevraient les attentats à la bombe de 2005 à Londres comme justifiés. Nous avons également étudié à quel point l'identité religieuse, l'identité nationale et le soutien au terrorisme étaient prédisposés par le contexte (la concentration de Musulmans dans une zone) et par les expériences de contact avec des non Musulmans. Le rôle de ces variables a été évalué en plus des variables démographiques pertinentes telles que le sexe, l'âge, et le

Key-words

Religious Identity,
National Identity,
Terrorism, Intergroup
Contact, British
Muslims

Mots-clés

Identité religieuse,
identité nationale,
terrorisme, contact
intergroupe,
musulmans
britanniques

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identity was significantly negatively related to support. Having contact with non-Muslims was positively related to importance of British identity, negatively to importance of Muslim identity, and also directly predicted reduced support for the attacks. The concentration of Muslims in the area was positively related to the importance of Muslim identity and negatively to contact with non-Muslims. These findings are discussed in relation to recent efforts to integrate Muslims more into British society.

statut socio-économique. Un modèle en équations structurales a révélé que le soutien aux attaques terroristes n'était pas lié de façon significative à l'identité Musulmane mais qu'il était négativement lié à l'identité Britannique. Le contact avec des non Musulmans est positivement corrélé à l'importance de l'identité Britannique, est négativement corrélé à l'importance de l'identité Musulmane et prédit directement une baisse du soutien aux attaques terroristes. La concentration de Musulmans dans une zone est positivement corrélée avec l'importance de l'identité Musulmane et négativement corrélée avec la fréquentation de non Musulmans. Ces résultats sont discutés en lien avec les efforts récents d'intégrer davantage les Musulmans au sein de la société Britannique.

Academic interest in the social, political, historical, and economic factors involved in terrorist activities has increased drastically since the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 (see Lum, Kennedy, & Sherley, 2004). Although the terrorism literature still lacks empirical research (see Lum, et al., 2004), greater insights have been gained in the recent years into the dynamics of terrorist activities, as well as the attributes of individual terrorists (see Silke, 2004). There have been fewer systematic efforts to determine the predictors of public support for terrorism (see Fair & Shepherd, 2006). Several authors have argued, however, that the sympathy of even a small minority is likely to play a vital role in the politics of terrorism by, for example, providing ideological and practical support to terrorists (e.g., Hayes & McAllister, 2005; Mascini, 2006; Waldman, 2006). Identifying and addressing the factors underlying such support should therefore be an important part of any attempt to understand and tackle terrorism.

The role of psycho-political variables in the reactions to March 11, terrorist attacks in Madrid (Spain)

*Le rôle de variables psycho-politiques en réaction aux attaques terroristes
du 11 Mars à Madrid (Espagne)*

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Guillermo B. Willis**

Abstract

Our research investigates the Spanish people's psycho-political reactions toward the terrorist attacks of March 11, 2004, in Madrid, Spain. We tested hypotheses related to the influence of individuals' ideological factors, such as hopes and fears for the future, and developed indexes of Spaniards' evaluations of perceived out-groups. Spaniard respondents ($N = 342$) reported their hopes and fears (adapted from Pratto, Lemieux, Glasford, & Henry, 2003) both 2 and 4 weeks following the terrorist attacks. Social dominance and political orientation predicted fears and hopes as well as some indexes of the perceived out-group evaluations (i.e., Arabs/Muslims and North Americans). We discuss an integral model present-

Résumé

Cette étude porte sur les réactions psycho-politiques des Espagnols à l'attaque terroriste du 11 Mars 2004, à Madrid en Espagne. Nous avons testé les hypothèses relatives à l'influence de facteurs idéologiques individuels, tels que les espoirs et les craintes pour l'avenir, et développé des indices d'évaluations des Espagnols envers des exogroupes. Ces participants Espagnols ($N = 342$) ont rapporté leurs espoirs et leurs craintes (adapté de Pratto, Lemieux, Glasford, & Henry, 2003) deux semaines puis quatre semaines après les attentats terroristes. La dominance sociale et l'orientation politique prédisent d'une part les craintes et les espoirs ainsi que certains indices d'évaluation des exogroupes (i.e., les Arabes, les

Key-words

Social dominance orientation, political orientation, terrorist attacks, psycho-political reactions

Mots-clés

Dominance sociale, orientation politique, attaques terroristes, réactions psycho-politiques

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ing the psycho-political influence of a catastrophic event on people's social beliefs and reactions to relevant out-groups.

Musulmans et les Américains du Nord). Nous discutons d'un modèle intégrateur de l'influence psychopolitique d'un événement catastrophique sur les croyances sociales et les réactions des gens envers des exogroupes en rapport avec cet événement.

March 11, 2004, dramatically affected Spaniards' lives. On that day, Madrid suffered a terrorist attack. Several bombs were placed in a train that travelled between Madrid and its surrounding cities. The bombs exploded, killing almost two hundred people and injuring thousands more.

Unfortunately, even before those attacks, Spaniards were not strangers to terrorism. ETA, a political movement that claims independence for Basque Country, has killed more than 800 people and injured some thousands more in Spain since 1968. But the magnitude of the terrorist attacks of March 11th, the identity of the perpetrators, and the contemporary national and international socio-political scenarios conferred a critical importance to these attacks. March 11th constituted a natural laboratory for studying the political psychology of inter-group relations between Spaniards and other groups involved in such events.

Terrorism has several consequences. For instance, the September 11th attacks in the United States spawned several scholarly inquiries into the psychological effects of terrorist attacks, including their effects on character strength (Peterson & Seligman, 2003), stress (Saylor, Cowart, Lipovsky, Jackson, & Finch, 2003; Schlenger et al., 2002; Schuster et al., 2001; Silver, Holman, McIntosh, Poulin, & Gil-Rivas, 2002; Wayment, 2004), and psychological adjustment (Mehl & Pennebaker, 2003). Researchers have confirmed that Americans were severely affected by the attacks of September 11th. For instance, within two months of those terrorist attacks, significant levels of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depressive symptoms in a large representative sample of Manhattan residents were reported (Galea et al., 2003). Data from a random sample of Americans who lived outside of New York City indicated that 17% of the U.S. population had

Enemies Welcome: Personal Threat and Reactions to Outgroup Doves and Hawks

Bienvenue aux ennemis : menace personnelle et réaction aux exogroupes « Colombes » et « Faucons ».

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*Nicolas Koranyi**

*Christiane Beyer**

*Eva Jonas***

*Beatrice Fleischmann**

Abstract

Personal threat might hamper the resolution of intergroup conflicts involving terrorist violence by increasing stereotypic thinking towards outgroups associated with terrorism. This is indicated in research showing that existential personal threat elicits more positive evaluations of stereotype consistent and more negative evaluations of stereotype inconsistent outgroup members. In two experiments with Non-Muslim German participants we investigated the effects of both threats to existence and threats to control on reactions towards Muslim supporters (hawks, consistent with stereotype) and Muslim opponents of Islamist terrorism (doves, not consistent with stereotype). In line with our predictions

Résumé

La menace personnelle pourrait entraver la résolution des conflits intergroupes comprenant des violences terroristes en augmentant la pensée stéréotypée vis-à-vis des exogroupes associés au terrorisme. Des travaux mettent en évidence qu'une menace existentielle personnelle suscite des évaluations plus positives envers les membres des exogroupes consistants avec leur stéréotype et des évaluations plus négatives lorsqu'il s'agit de membres d'exogroupes inconsistants avec leur stéréotype. Deux études menées auprès d'Allemands non Musulmans explorent les effets de la menace existentielle et de la menace d'une perte de contrôle sur la réaction envers des Musulmans favorables au terrorisme islamiste

Key-words

Violent intergroup conflict, terrorism, mortality salience, control motivation, stereotype preservation

Mots-clés

Conflit intergroupe violent, terrorisme, saillance de la mort, motivation de contrôle, préservation des stéréotypes

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we found decreased positive reactions towards doves following death salience in Study 1. Reduced positive evaluation of doves was also found as a tendency when lack of control was made salient in Study 2. In addition, salience of low control made negative reactions towards outgroup hawks less negative. The results illustrate a vicious circle of terrorist threat eliciting threats to personal life and control which in turn lead to the preservation of hostile outgroup stereotypes and thus intergroup conflict.

(les «faucons» ou belliqueux, consistants avec le stéréotype) et envers des Musulmans qui lui sont opposés (les «colombes» ou pacifistes, inconsistants avec le stéréotype). Conformément à nos attentes, nous avons observé dans l'étude 1 une diminution des réactions positives envers les «colombes» après une exposition à la saillance de la mort. Dans la 2^e étude, nous avons observé une légère diminution des évaluations positives des «colombes» dans le cas d'une menace de perte de contrôle. Par ailleurs, lorsque la menace d'une perte de contrôle est faible, les réactions envers l'exogroupe «faucons» sont moins négatives. Ces résultats illustrent un cercle vicieux de la menace terroriste, qui menace la vie et le contrôle personnel et qui en retour contribue au maintien de stéréotypes hostiles envers les hors-groupes et renforce ainsi les conflits intergroupes.

Violent intergroup conflicts have a tendency to self-perpetuate (e.g., Kelman & Fisher, 2003). In such conflicts, members of involved groups often experience individual threat leading to thinking and behavior that might itself contribute to the aggravation of conflict (Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003; see also Motyl & Pyszczynski, 2009, this issue). In this article we investigate in how far threats to personal existence and control may determine reactions to outgroup hawks (supporters of violence) and doves (opponents of violence) in intergroup conflicts involving terrorist violence. We build on prior evidence indicating that existential threat should lead to increased liking for stereotypic and decreased liking for non-stereotypic outgroup members. As members of outgroups associated with violence who oppose violent conflict measures should be perceived as non-stereotypic personal threat may decrease their liking and may thus hamper de-escalation of conflict. In turn, outgroup hawks who support

A shooter bias in Germany against people wearing Muslims headgear

Le biais du tireur en Allemagne envers des personnes portant une coiffe musulmane

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*Nina Müller**

*Gesa Sobbe**

*Nora Spannaus**

Abstract

We expect a negative attitude in Germany against Muslims, based on the perceived close association of Islam and terrorism. The shooter task paradigm served as an attitude measure (Correll, Park, Judd & Wittenbrink, 2002); this task requests participants to make rapid decisions to shoot or not to shoot at armed and unarmed targets, respectively. Independent from actual target status (armed vs. unarmed), targets wore traditional Muslim headgear (Turban/Hijab). Participants showed a clear tendency to shoot more at targets wearing Muslim headgear than at the same targets wearing no headgear. In addition, participants rated each targets' likeability. These ratings showed greater likeability for targets with Muslim headgear.

Résumé

Nous supposons que des attitudes négatives envers des Musulmans, en Allemagne, sont fondées sur une association étroite entre la perception de l'islam et celle du terrorisme. Le paradigme de la tâche du «tireur» a servi de mesure d'attitude (Correll et al., 2002) ; cette tâche consiste à demander aux participants de prendre rapidement des décisions de tirer ou non sur des cibles armées ou pas. Quel que soit leur statut réel (cible armée vs. cible non armée), les cibles portaient la coiffe Musulmane traditionnelle (Turban/Hijab). Les participants ont nettement plus tiré sur des cibles portant la coiffe Musulmane que sur les mêmes cibles qui ne la portaient pas. Par ailleurs, les participants ont évalué la sympathie perçue des cibles. Ces

Key-words

Turban Effect,
Islamophobia, Hijab,
Prejudice against
Muslims

Mots-clés

Effet turban,
islamophobie, voile,
préjugés à l'égard des
musulmans

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This result is discussed in light of attitudes' automatic and controlled components (Devine, 1989). Finally, we discuss loop-sided media reports and illusory correlation accounts as sources for negative attitudes against Muslims, beyond standard out-group derogation explanations.

évaluations se sont avérées les plus favorables envers les cibles avec une coiffe Musulmane. Ce résultat est discuté à la lumière des composantes automatiques et contrôlées des attitudes (Devine, 1989). Finalement, au-delà des explications classiques de la discrimination des exogroupes, nous discutons du rôle des récits médiatiques biaisés et des corrélations illusoires, sources d'attitudes négatives envers les Musulmans.

In the last decade, people have experienced terrorist attacks worldwide. The assaults on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington in 2001, the Madrid train bombings in 2004, and the London Tube bombings in 2005, have kept the idea and concept of terrorism constantly present in people's minds. In most media reports on these and many other attacks, they have been closely linked with Middle-Eastern culture and Islamic religion. This link of Islam with terror is rather new, especially in Europe. For example, in Germany, the term "terror" was formerly closely associated with the RAF ("Rote Armee Fraktion"), a radical communist group in the seventies (Winkler, 2008). This kind of political terrorism has now almost vanished within Germany; the term shifted in its meaning from socialist-revolutionary (e.g., as for groups as RAF or FARC) and ethnic-nationalist connotations (e.g., as for groups as ETA or IRA) to an almost exclusive association with the Middle-East and the Islamic religion. The present research aims to investigate negative attitudes towards members of these latter social groups, negative attitudes that should arise from people's perceived close association of Islam and terror.

We make no definite claims about the possible sources of this association, but we want to suggest a very simple explanation. Although most people have no direct experiences that link danger, threat, or violence with the Middle-East or Islam, the

Terrorist Threat and Perceived Islamic Support for Terrorist Attacks as Predictors of Personal and Institutional Out-Group Discrimination and Support for Anti-Immigration Policies – Evidence from 9 European Countries

Menace terroriste islamique et perception du soutien pour les attaques terroristes en tant que prédicteurs de la discrimination personnelle et institutionnelle envers le hors-groupe et du soutien de politiques d'anti-immigration – le cas de 9 pays Européens

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Abstract

Traditionally, research has shown that subtle and blatant prejudices are important predictors of out-group discrimination and support for anti-immigration policies. The present paper shows that, when controlling for these types of prejudices and for political conservatism, terrorist threat and perceived Islamic support for terrorism are related to such negative out-group treatment as well. We conducted survey-interviews with a random

Résumé

Traditionnellement, les recherches ont montré que des préjugés subtils et flagrants étaient d'importants prédicteurs de la discrimination envers les hors-groupes et du soutien de politiques d'anti-immigration. Le présent article montre, qu'après avoir contrôlé ces deux types de préjugés ainsi que le conservatisme politique, la menace terroriste et la perception du soutien pour le terrorisme islamique étaient liées au traitement

Key-words

Out-group

Discrimination;
Terrorist Threat; Subtle
Prejudice; Blatant
Prejudice; Muslims

Mots-clés

Discrimination hors-
groupe, menace
terroriste, préjugé
subtil, préjugé flagrant,
Musulmans

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selection of a representative sample of 775 women and 634 men (age range 16-91 years) from 9 different European countries.¹ Across this sample, we first demonstrate that terrorist threat and perceived support for terrorism by Muslims directly and uniquely can predict more personal discrimination of Muslims, higher approval of institutional discrimination against Muslims, and higher endorsement of strict anti-immigration policies. In addition, we show the indirect effects of terrorist threat and perceived support for terrorism by Muslims because they predict traditional determinants of negative out-group treatment (i.e., both subtle and blatant prejudices). Results are discussed in terms of the unique role of terrorist threat and perceived Islamic support for terrorism in relation to traditional prejudices, as determinants of negative out-group treatment.

négatif des hors-groupes. Nous avons effectué des enquêtes d'entretiens à partir d'une sélection aléatoire d'un échantillon représentatif de 775 femmes et de 634 hommes (tranche d'âge 16-91 ans) provenant de 9 pays européens différents. À travers cet échantillon, nous avons tout d'abord montré que la menace terroriste et la perception du soutien du terrorisme par les musulmans peut prédire directement et de façon unique le renforcement de la discrimination personnelle envers les musulmans, de l'approbation de la discrimination institutionnelle à l'encontre des musulmans et de l'adhésion à des politiques strictes d'anti-immigration. En outre, nous montrons les effets indirects de la menace terroriste et de la perception du soutien du terrorisme par les musulmans en ce sens qu'ils prédisent les déterminants traditionnels de la discrimination envers les hors-groupes (i.e., les préjugés subtils et flagrants). Les résultats sont discutés dans les termes du rôle unique et déterminant exercé par la menace terroriste et par la perception du soutien pour le terrorisme islamique sur les préjugés traditionnels et le traitement discriminatoire envers les hors-groupes.

1. The analyses are based on the survey “Group-Focused Enmity in Europe” (GFE-Europe) conducted in nine European countries in 2006. The survey was part of a research initiative by the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence at the University of Bielefeld, Germany, initiated and managed by Andreas Zick, Beate Küpper, and Wilhelm Heitmeyer. The survey is granted to the University of Bielefeld by the Compagnia di San Paolo, the Volkswagen Foundation, the Freudenberg Foundation, and two unnamed foundations.

Group Favoritism and Support for Government Policies as a Function of Patriotic Orientation and Perceived Threat

Favoritisme de groupe et soutien de politiques publiques en fonction de l'orientation patriotique et de la perception de menace

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Lisa Hathaway**

Abstract

We examined whether two forms of national identification (i.e., blind and constructive patriotism) and perceived threat predicted a) the acceptance of government policies related to terrorism and b) feelings toward a variety of national and international groups. Analyses were conducted using data from 297 undergraduates. Participants completed measures of blind and constructive patriotism, perceived terrorist threat, attitudes toward terrorism-related government policies, and attitudes toward specific groups and nations. As expected, constructive patriotism was associated with greater acceptance of cooperative policies, whereas blind patriotism was associated with acceptance of using military force and curtailing civil liberties. We also found that those who were low on constructive patriotism but high on

Résumé

Nous avons vérifié si deux formes d'identification nationale (i.e., patriotisme aveugle et constructif) et la menace perçue prédisent a) l'acceptation de politiques publiques reliées au terrorisme et b) les sentiments envers une variété de groupes nationaux et internationaux. Des analyses ont été effectuées en utilisant les données de 297 étudiants de premier cycle. Les participants ont complété des mesures de patriotisme aveugle et constructif, de perception d'une menace terroriste, d'attitudes envers des groupes spécifiques et des nations. Comme prévu, le patriotisme constructif a été associé à une plus grande acceptation des politiques de coopération, alors que le patriotisme aveugle a été associé à l'acceptation d'utiliser la force militaire et de restreindre les libertés civiles. Nous avons également

Key-words

National identification, patriotism, perceived threat, intergroup attitudes, terrorism

Mots-clés

Identification nationale, patriotisme, menace perçue, attitudes intergroupes, terrorisme

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blind patriotism were more positively biased toward conservatives as perceived threat increased. Results are discussed in terms of their significance in understanding how different forms of national identification influence the relationship between perceived threat and group-based attitudes.

ment constaté que ceux qui étaient les moins patriotiques constructifs, et en même temps les plus patriotes aveugles, se révélaient davantage biaisés vers le conservatisme lorsque la menace perçue augmentait. Les résultats sont discutés à la lumière de leur intérêt pour comprendre comment les différentes formes d'identification nationale influencent la relation entre la menace perçue et les attitudes fondées sur les groupes.

Following the events of September 11, 2001, there were substantial increases in both national identification and a sense of threat in the United States (Huddy, Khatib, & Capelos, 2002; Li & Brewer, 2004; Moskalenko, McCauley, & Rozin, 2006). While researchers have shown that the negative effects associated with most major disasters, whether humanly caused or natural, begin to dissipate within about six weeks after the event (Pennebaker & Harber, 1993), this was certainly not the case following September 11. In fact, three years after 9/11, the specter of terrorism in the United States was still prominent. While the persistent effects of 9/11 can be partially explained by the severity of the acts, they may have also been due to the pervasiveness of terrorism-themed shows and stories in the mainstream media, as well as government pronouncements regarding the ever-present threat of terrorist activity. Previous research has shown that high levels of both perceived threat and group identification have observable effects on intragroup and intergroup perceptions. However, much of the previous work has conceptualized group identification as a unidimensional construct. In the current study, we examined whether different forms of national identification, in combination with perceived threat, would differentially predict attitudes regarding terrorism-related policies, as well as attitudes towards a variety of relevant social groups.

The Existential Underpinnings of the Cycle of Terrorist and Counterterrorist Violence and Pathways to Peaceful Resolutions

Les fondements existentiels du cycle de la violence terroriste et antiterroriste et voies d'accès à des solutions pacifiques

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Abstract

This article provides a terror management theory perspective on the psychological factors that lead groups and individuals to endorse, promote, and engage in violent actions as part of political, ethnic, and religious conflicts. This perspective provides an empirically-based, theoretically-driven approach to understanding the ways in which ideological, nationalistic, and religious beliefs interact with historical events and concrete complaints to lead people to accept, condone, or participate in terrorist activities. Research provides convergent evidence suggesting that many of the same psychological factors are at work in the minds of people on opposing sides of such conflicts. This suggests that the factors driving people toward terrorism are the same as those which drive people toward extreme counterterrorism measures that often create substantial

Résumé

Cet article fournit une vue de la théorie de gestion de la terreur sur les facteurs psychologiques qui conduisent les groupes et les individus à soutenir, promouvoir et à s'engager dans des actions violentes dans le cadre de conflits politiques, ethniques et religieux. Cette perspective s'appuie sur une approche empirique et théorique qui vise à comprendre la façon dont des croyances idéologiques, nationalistes et religieuses interagissent avec des événements historiques et des mécontentements concrets, et conduisent les personnes à accepter, tolérer, ou à participer à des activités terroristes. Cette recherche fournit des preuves convergentes qu'un grand nombre de facteurs psychologiques identiques sont à l'œuvre dans l'esprit des personnes qui ont des conflits les opposant. Ceci suggère que les facteurs qui conduisent les gens au terrorisme

Key-words

Terrorism, death, terror management, peace, conflict

Mots-clés

Terrorisme, mort, gestion de la terreur, paix, conflit

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tial collateral damage which commonly helps terrorists grow broader support for their causes and increase recruitment. After describing processes that promote this cycle of violence, we discuss theory and research that suggests pathways through which violent responses to such conflicts can be discouraged.

sont les mêmes que ceux qui poussent les personnes à prendre des mesures extrêmes contre le terrorisme, créant ainsi souvent des dommages collatéraux considérables qui aident les terroristes à obtenir un plus large soutien pour leur causes et à intensifier le recrutement. Après avoir décrit les processus qui favorisent le cycle de la violence, nous discutons des aspects théoriques et de la recherche qui suggèrent des voies par lesquelles des réactions violentes à de tels conflits peuvent être découragées.

The history of human conflict supports the old adage that violence begets more violence. For example, in 1916 the Irish Republican Army (IRA) staged the Easter Rising rebellion to protest British rule. At this point the IRA had little support from the Irish public. However, after a harsh British rebuke to this rebellion in which thousands of Irish people were arrested or placed in internment camps and dozens of their countrymen were executed by firing squads, the IRA experienced a dramatic increase in support along with a steady stream of volunteers and supplies that extended that conflict for most of the century. Likewise, support for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) increased dramatically among Tamils following the Sri Lankan government's enactment of a series of laws that targeted the Tamil population. Some scholars have argued the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States were designed, at least in part, to elicit extreme retaliation from the United States as a way of uniting the Muslim community behind the extremist movement that perpetrated those attacks (e.g., Richardson, 2006). Following the attacks, the United States and some allied Western powers invaded Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, many moderate, ordinary Muslim civilians became "collateral damage" and died by the thousands ("Terrorism analyst: National intelligence," 2007).